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Living in the senses and 
learning with love – John 
MacMurray’s philosophy of 
embodied emotion 
James MacAllister, Malcolm Thorburn
Abstract: In this article we analyse the central role that the body plays in John 
MacMurray’s account of learning to be human. As with Merleau-Ponty, MacMurray 
rejected mind-body dualisms and argued for the need to understand what it means 
to be a person. Through our analysis we highlight the key principles that charac-
terize MacMurray’s philosophy in relation to personhood and the body, namely: 1) 
all human knowledge and action should be for the sake of friendship and 2) human 
persons exist first and foremost in their bodies as ‘knowing agents’ rather than in 
their minds as ‘knowing subjects’. We thereafter explain MacMurray’s views on edu-
cation and how it must support people to live in personal rather than functional 
relation with each other by attending more to bodily experience and education of 
the emotions. Accordingly, MacMurray considered that persons can either ‘use’ their 
bodily senses as mere instruments for functional purposes or they can ‘live’ in their 
bodily senses by learning to love (not ‘using’ but rather apprehending the real value 
of) other persons. In conclusion, we suggest that MacMurray’s philosophy can open 
up a different way of thinking about the educational value of physical activity. For 
MacMurray shared physical pursuits are especially educational when carried out for 
their own sake and when all persons’ present experience moments of bodily joy and 
togetherness and a better understanding of each other.
Key words: senses, persons, agency, love
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Introduction
It is only in more recent times that the philosophical work of John Mac-
Murray has begun to generate scholarly interest in the field of education1. 
We think this is rather surprising for at least three reasons. First, Mac-
Murray wrote and spoke quite extensively and eloquently on the subject 
of education over the course of a long and distinguished academic career2. 
Second, he was personally involved in the running of two educational estab-
lishments informed by his philosophy of education. MacMurray served as 
chairman of the board of the progressively experimental Wennington School 
in Lancashire throughout its (35 year) existence until it closed in 1975. Dur-
ing this time he both acted as mentor and friend to the head teacher there, 
Kenneth Barnes, while also making financial contributions to the school. As 
Costello notes of MacMurray’s involvement in Wennington: ‘it was a clear 
instance of that rather rare event: putting one’s energy and money where 
one’s mouth was – for a lifetime’ (2002, p. 374). MacMurray was also on the 
Executive Committee of Newbattle Abbey College from 1937-1956. Newbat-
tle was a pioneering project in MacMurray’s native Scotland intended to 
offer foundation courses in humanistic thinking to students who may not 
previously have had access to them – and in particular adults from working 
class backgrounds. While there turned out to be little appetite in Scotland 
at the time for such an institution, the Newbattle experience did cement in 
MacMurray’s mind what he took to be the principal problem inherent in 
both education and wider society – the dominance of technicist and com-
petitive imperatives over co-operative, humane and personal ones (MacMur-
ray, 2012; Costello, 2002). 
Which brings us to the third reason we find it surprising that there has 
been relatively little attention devoted to the educational views of MacMur-
ray – we think that what MacMurray had to say on the state of play in edu-
cation over 50 years ago is of continuing relevance today, perhaps especially 
in regards to the education of the body and the whole person. This article 
will therefore articulate the central role that the body plays in MacMur-
ray’s account of learning to be human and it will seek to tease out some 
possible points of relevance from Macmurray’s philosophy to contemporary 
1 See for example Pring, Facer, Stern, Cunningham, Noddings, Gaita and Fielding (all 
2012) and Fielding (2006, 2007a and 2007b).
2 Costello (2002) notes that MacMurray collected together his own writings on education 
into book form in the early 1970’s only for this manuscript to be rejected by Faber. For 
good examples of MacMurray’s writing specifically on education see MacMurray (2012, 
1964).
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physical education. The argument unfolds in three phases. We firstly high-
light the key principles that characterize MacMurray’s philosophy of the per-
sonal, namely: 1) all human knowledge and action should be for the sake of 
friendship and 2) human persons exist first and foremost in their bodies as 
‘knowing agents’ rather than in their minds as ‘knowing subjects’. We sec-
ondly show how MacMurray considered that persons can either ‘use’ their 
bodily senses as mere instruments for functional purposes or they can ‘live’ 
in their bodily senses by learning to love (by apprehending the real value 
of) what is other than them (especially other persons). We thirdly explain 
MacMurray’s views on education and how it must support people to live in 
personal rather than functional relation with each other by attending more 
to bodily experience and education of the emotions. In the process we review 
some possible implications for education of MacMurray’s theory of embodied 
emotions, and in particular, how it could challenge educators to reconsider 
the value and purposes of their practices.
John MacMurray’s philosophy of personal life
‘Personal life...in distinction both from the individual and social life...is the 
life which we live as persons, and we can live it only by entering into relation-
ships with other people on a fully personal basis, in which we give ourselves 
to one another; or, to put the same thing the other way round, in which we 
accept each other freely for what we are’ (MacMurray, 1961, p. 101).
John MacMurray’s philosophy was centrally concerned with addressing 
the question of what it means to be a person. In Persons in Relation (1961b) 
MacMurray explained why he chose to give his philosophical attention to 
the concept of the personal rather than personality. He felt that the latter 
term had become almost synonymous with the individual characteristics 
that differentiate one person from another (personal individuality), rather 
than the set of essential attributes that are common to all people and make 
each person a person. It was the latter issue of what it means to be a person, 
rather than what it is that makes us individual persons, that most interested 
MacMurray. One of the first attempts he made to address the meaning of 
human personhood can be found in his lecture on The Personal Life, which 
is published in Reason and Emotion (1961), a book that contains a number 
of other public lectures he delivered for radio broadcast in the 1930’s and 
1940’s. In this lecture he explained that ‘we must be clear about what is 
meant by personal life. It is the life we lead as human beings’ (MacMurray, 
1961, p. 93). However, MacMurray recognised that equating the personal 
life with the human one was rather platitudinous without further elabora-
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tion. He therefore sought to distinguish personal life from both individual 
life on the one hand, and social life on the other. MacMurray felt that the 
tendency to contrast individual and social life was a misleading and unhelp-
ful one - particularly if social life is construed (and he felt it often was) as 
a series of obligations towards, and restrictions imposed upon, our individ-
ual existence by wider society. He therefore stressed that the ‘personal life 
is not the life that we live in solitude, when there is nobody to interfere with 
our personal preferences and prejudices’ (ibid, pp 95-96). Instead he argued 
that the personal sphere does not refer to our individual wants and desires 
at all - it is rather composed of human relations between people. 
However, MacMurray was also adamant that the sets of human relations 
that characterise personal life are very different from, and much richer than, 
merely social relations. This is so as social relationships presuppose, as 
a matter of fact, a degree of impersonality (MacMurray, 1961). Social life 
for MacMurray frequently depended upon people involving themselves in 
impersonal relations with others - impersonal as persons enter into such 
relations not with the whole of themselves but only with part of themselves. 
However, just because we cannot always express the whole of our person-
hood in all of our interactions with others, does not mean that we can only 
be ourselves when we are alone - far from it. Indeed, for MacMurray, ‘to 
be ourselves at all, we need other people’ (ibid, p. 97). MacMurray is even 
more emphatic about this in Persons in Relation where he argues that there 
can be no person whatsoever, without two persons in communication. Thus 
personal life can be distinguished from individual life on account of the fact 
that we need the presence of others (albeit in a particular way) to be per-
sons at all. Importantly, personal life can also be differentiated from social 
life on account of the onus distinctively personal relations place upon us to 
express our whole selves to others, as opposed to only parts of ourselves (as 
is required in merely social relations). As MacMurray puts it: ‘the personal 
life demands...a relationship with one another in which we can be our whole 
selves and have complete freedom to express everything that we are’ (ibid, p. 
97). Moreover, the personal life not only requires a full of expression of who 
we are to others, it also necessitates a loving acceptance of others when they 
express the whole of themselves to us. And MacMurray allots a name for 
such open, expressive and accepting relations between persons - friendship. 
He articulates this as follows: ‘friendship is a type of relationship in which 
people enter as persons with the whole of themselves’ (ibid, p. 101).
MacMurray specifies that the sorts of friendships that make up the personal 
life have no ulterior motive beyond the personal interaction itself. He explains 
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that there are two opposing varieties of relations with others: functional rela-
tions where we fraternize with others merely to achieve some other purpose, 
and personal relations, which we enter into without extrinsic purpose. Per-
sonal relations come to exist for their own sake and for the sake of our friends, 
rather than our selves. It is not a genuine friendship and personal relation if 
two persons only relate with each other merely to get something else out of it 
(MacMurray, 1961, 1961b) - such associations are functional as the purpose 
of the relation is determined by a function external to it. Real friendships in 
contrast have no external function. They are instead founded upon a motive 
of love for the other and a desire to get to know the other person better and 
see them flourish in the world more. MacMurray eloquently expresses it like 
so: ‘when you love anyone you want above all things to be aware of him, more 
and more completely and delicately. You want to see him and hear him, not 
because you want to make use of him but simply because that is the natural 
and only way of taking delight in his existence for his sake. That is the way of 
love and it is the only way of being alive’ (MacMurray, 1961, p. 42). 
While MacMurray does not dispute that a prosperous society in part 
depends upon functional relations, he emphasises that the value of func-
tional interactions should be measured by the extent to which they further 
distinctively personal relations. For MacMurray both individual and social 
life should be subordinate to, and for the sake of, personal life. Indeed, all 
human association ‘has only one meaning...it is the necessary foundation 
on which the personal life can be built. Society exists for the life of per-
sonal friendship’ (ibid, p. 102). MacMurray goes as far to suggest that all of 
morality depends upon our capacity to prioritise personal over functional 
relations (1961) while in both the Self as Agent and Persons in Relation, 
MacMurray explicitly argues that all human knowledge and action should 
be for the sake of friendship. The distinctively personal life is therefore one 
where the establishment and maintenance of fully expressive and accepting 
friendships takes precedence over all other priorities and where all feeling, 
thought and action must ultimately nurture and sustain such friendships. 
Indeed, we think that this is the first and fundamental principle of MacMur-
ray’s philosophy. We think that the second fundamental principle of Mac-
Murray’s philosophy is that in the distinctively personal life that prioritises 
friendship, personal existence is experienced first and foremost in the body 
rather than in the mind. As we shall see later in the paper, this view of per-
sonhood, as being lived in and through the body, carries with it significant 
educational implications.
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The crisis in personal life
MacMurray was in the first place motivated to articulate a philosophy 
of the personal because he felt that there was a crisis in ‘personal life’ 
brought about by the revolutionary economic and technological changes 
that emerged in the twentieth century (1956, 2012). There were, he said, 
two key indicators for this crisis of the personal: 1) the decline of the influ-
ence of religion in personal life and 2) the growth in the influence of the state 
and technology in personal life (1956). The increasing appeal to political 
authority not only evidenced an increasing unwillingness for people to as-
sume personal responsibility for their own actions; it also fuelled the growth 
and reach of the state to the extent that the personal aspect of human life 
was now being subsumed within and dominated by the functional aspect of 
human life (MacMurray, 1956). MacMurray concluded that the form of the 
personal was thus the emergent social problem of the twentieth century and 
as such should be the emergent problem considered by philosophers of that 
era too. Indeed, MacMurray thought that other developments in twentieth 
century philosophy, including phenomenology, existentialism, and logical 
empiricism were also in no small part a response to this personal crisis 
(1956). However, he did not think that either existentialism or logical empiri-
cism had adequately responded to the personal crisis. Nor did he think that 
the dominant Kantian/Descartesian tradition in western philosophy had 
within it the resources to respond to the personal crisis either (MacMurray, 
1956). While existentialism had rightly identified that philosophy needed to 
focus its attention upon the very real and human problems like despair and 
anxiety in the face of global warfare, existential writing was for MacMurray 
expressed in such an aesthetic style that it had abandoned philosophical 
form altogether. Logical empiricism in contrast retained philosophical form 
and style while retreating further and further from the practical problems of 
human life in favour of metaphysics (MacMurray, 1956). 
There can be little doubt however that MacMurray thought that phenom-
enology was the branch of new philosophy best placed to grapple with the 
emergent crisis in personal life for he stated that ‘phenomenological analysis 
is a useful device’ (MacMurray, 1956, p 28) that we should be grateful for, 
when considering the limitations in the western philosophical tradition3. 
In this respect, MacMurray, like phenomenologists such as Merleau-Pon-
ty, rejected mind-body dualisms and thought that we must try to better 
3 MacMurray is also said to have delivered a series of five lectures on the ‘phenomenol-
ogy of the personal’ in 1929, though the materials that formed the content of these 
lectures has never been found (Costello, 2002). 
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understand what it means to be a person. Importantly MacMurray, like 
Merleau-Ponty also thought that the philosophy of Kant and Descartes had 
mistakenly downplayed the significance of the body in human life. Though 
MacMurray did consider full personhood to be impossible without others, 
he did not question the fact that individual selves could and most often did 
exist in isolation. Indeed, the Self as Agent (1956) is a text devoted to under-
standing the nature of the existence of the self in isolation. In this treatise, 
MacMurray sought to challenge what he considered to be the theoretical and 
egocentric presuppositions apparent in the modern philosophical account of 
selfhood advanced by Kant and Descartes. MacMurray did so by articulating 
an in depth account of the self, conceived of as an active, communal and 
relational agent rather than an egocentric, knowing and withdrawn indi-
vidualistic subject (1956, 1961b). 
In MacMurray’s philosophy human agency signifies a capacity to act in 
the world and so influence and change the world. In contrast human subjec-
tivity signifies a withdrawal from the world of action and sensory experience 
into one of pure thought and intellectual reflection. Significantly, MacMur-
ray maintained that selves are agents first and subjects second (1956). In 
taking this stance he effectively called for the primacy of practical rather 
than theoretical life for human persons. MacMurray felt that the crisis in 
personal life had reached such dehumanizing proportions that it was no 
longer viable to retreat from it, into thought, and so construe the self as ‘the 
subject in experience, and so as knower. The self must be conceived not 
theoretically as subject, but practically, as agent’ (MacMurray, 1956, p. 38). 
MacMurray proposed that the Cartesian/Kantian mind and body dualism 
must be rejected through the assertion of the ‘primacy of the practical’. By 
this he meant the substitution of the ‘I think’ with the ‘I do’ as the starting 
point for philosophy. MacMurray not only called for philosophy to take prac-
tical life as its focus over theoretical life though, he ultimately thought that 
human behaviour, thought and action could only be properly understood 
from a personal, active and bodily perspective. MacMurray, thought that 
human selves exist first and foremost in their bodies as agents rather than 
in their minds as subjects. 
The person as knowing agent in the body
MacMurray argued that philosophy had to abandon its positioning of the 
self as thinker in isolation (as in the Kantian/Descartesian tradition) and 
instead give due recognition to the necessarily bodily and personal nature 
of human action and thought. He states that ‘if in any sense, the fact that 
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I am thinking proves – or should we say presupposes – my existence, then 
it certifies my existence not as a mind, but as a body (1956, p. 81). It is not 
then thought divorced from the body that confirms a person’s existence (as 
in the modern tradition) but rather thoughtful action, in the body. MacMur-
ray maintained that acting is not free from, but is rather always infused 
with thought. Indeed he argued that we always act with knowledge – it is 
mere movement that is devoid of thought. He stated that ‘knowledge is that 
in my action which makes it an action and not a blind activity’ (ibid, p. 127). 
MacMurray argued that action always occurs in the material world whereas 
(pure) thought involves a temporary reflective removal of the self from the 
material world. By retreating into thought and removing the possibility of 
material action one makes ones self a subject. MacMurray though reasons 
that as nothing can be acted on that is not material, the self as agent must 
be material - the self as subject must in contrast be non-material. ‘As Agent, 
therefore, the Self is the Body. Conversely, the Self, as subject, is the mind…
as subject the Self is non-agent, withdrawn from action, and, therefore, 
non-body’ (ibid, p. 91). MacMurray thus argues that human agency entails 
knowing action in the material world whereas human subjectivity entails 
a reflective withdrawal from action in the world. 
Furthermore MacMurray insists that human persons exist first and 
foremost in their bodies as ‘knowing agents’ rather than in their minds as 
‘knowing subjects’. While MacMurray thought it impossible to be both agent 
and subject at one and the same time he did not think the self was some-
how divided in two - between action on one hand and thought on the other. 
Rather it is the same self that acts and thinks at different moments and 
simultaneously. MacMurray emphasised that persons both act and think 
in their bodies and that the mind/body dualism instantiated by Descartes 
and Kant was therefore fictitious4. Acting and thinking are rather contrary 
limits on personal experience where ‘acting is the positive, while thinking 
is the negative limit (ibid, p. 87)’. Importantly thinking is negative because 
it negates the possibility of concrete worldly action while excluding a wide 
range of bodily experiences as well (MacMurray, 1956). Action however is an 
inclusive concept because it does not exclude bodily sensations. While action 
is primary and concrete and enmeshed with this world, thought is second-
ary and derivative and in important respects removed from this world. He 
explains this relation as follows:
4 Harrison (2002) also agrees that MacMurray especially sought to challenge what (he 
took to be) Kant’s failure to present a unified account of the self. MacMurray held that 
Kant was unable to explain how the same self exists in both the theoretical and practi-
cal spheres of life (MacMurray, 1956; Harrison, 2002).
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‘In thinking the mind alone is active. In acting the body is indeed active, 
but also the mind…When we act, sense, perception, and judgment are in 
continuous activity along with physical movement. When we think, we ex-
clude overt bodily movement at least…the ‘purer’ our thought becomes the 
more it excludes not merely perception, but all the sensuous elements, and 
moves in a shadowy world of abstract and general ideas. Action, then, is 
a full concrete activity of the self in which all our capacities are employed; 
while thought is constituted by the exclusion of some of our powers and 
a withdrawal into an activity which is less concrete and less complete.’ (Mac-
Murray, 1956, p. 86)
MacMurray emphasises then that the self is realised most fully in action 
rather than pure thought - the self is therefore essentially an agent that is 
able to act in and change the world rather than a subject who stands back 
from and thinks about the world. What distinguishes the self as agent and 
the self as subject is the capacity to effect change in the world and so deter-
mine the future. Through acting, persons generate or ‘bring into existence’ 
an actuality or possibility - to act is to determine a possibility (MacMurray, 
1956). Furthermore, action involves thought and ‘choice’ for MacMurray - 
a choice to generate a present possibility in this way rather than that and 
so (with time) determine the past in this way rather than that. MacMurray 
stressed that action is not preceded by choice but is choice – ‘the actual 
choice is the doing of the action’ (ibid, p. 140). However, MacMurray argued 
that only the past is wholly determinate. While we can predict what the fu-
ture might look like and consist of, a determinate future is not a ‘real’ future 
(MacMurray, 1956). 
In our view, the notion of the future as indeterminate, until human persons 
make choices through action, is central to MacMurray’s concept of agency. 
MacMurray argued that persons are only really agents able to change the fu-
ture shape of the world before them, if they really are free to shape the world 
before them (1956). If all actions were determined in advance then human 
beings would be predetermined objects rather than free agents (MacMurray, 
1956). Importantly MacMurray thought it was morally necessary for all per-
sons to be conceived of as free agents able to actively and consciously alter 
the world around them rather than subjects (who think about the world) 
or objects (we use in the world). To explain his reasoning on this point he 
indicates that in a social world the actions of others do, as a matter of fact, 
limit the possibilities of my own action (MacMurray, 1956). However, to con-
sider the actions of others as a mere limit upon my own, would be to fall 
into the mistaken functional understanding of human relations (where soci-
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ety merely limits individual desire and behaviour) discussed in the second 
section of this paper. For MacMurray meaningful personal interactions with 
others hinge on understanding that others are much more than limiters of 
my choice, or objects to be used. As we shall see in the next section, though 
MacMurray thought we exist first and foremost in our bodies as knowing 
agents, he also held that existence only becomes meaningful when we learn 
how to step outside the isolation of our individual bodily experience and into 
personal rather than functional relations with others. 
Living in the senses and learning with love
‘We have to learn to live with the whole of our bodies, not only with our 
heads. If we do this, we shall find ourselves able to act in the world’ (Mac-
Murray, 1961, p. 45)
Two principles appear to underpin MacMurray’s philosophy of educa-
tion - namely that: 1) education must support people to live in personal 
(rather than functional) relation with each other by 2) attending more to 
bodily sense experiences and education of the emotions5. In his lecture on 
Learning to be Human, MacMurray asserts that ‘the first priority in educa-
tion – if by education we mean learning to be human – is learning to live 
in personal relation with other people…I call this the first priority because 
failure in this is fundamental failure, which cannot be compensated for 
by success in other fields’ (MacMurray 2012, p. 670). MacMurray (1956, 
1960, 1961, 2012) suggests that people first live as individuals rather than 
as persons. Individuals are characterized by a dependence on others and 
by egocentricity. In contrast, persons are characterized by their capacity 
to live in interdependent relation with others. Fostering personal relation-
ships should be the primary task of education for MacMurray because it is 
through such relations that persons can successfully overcome the human 
predilection to egocentricity. MacMurray felt that education fails when per-
sons take their own feelings and interests to be more important than those 
of others. He also maintained that emotion education holds the key to edu-
cational success and to the transcending of the human tendency towards 
dependence and egocentricity. Indeed, an enhanced concentration on the 
education of bodily sensibility is the second educational priority specified 
by MacMurray (2012, p. 671). 
5 Fielding (2006, 2007) also takes the development of personal rather than functional 
relations to be at the core of MacMurray’s educational philosophy. Fielding elsewhere 
(2012) alludes to the centrality of emotional education in any Learning to be human.
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MacMurray maintained that our bodily senses (rather than our minds), 
are the gateway to the world outside of us - they are the primary source 
of all knowledge (1956, 1961, 2012). He indicates that persons can gain 
knowledge through their senses in two ways. On the one hand human 
senses can be used as instruments to provide facts about the world, which 
can in turn be used to solve practical and instrumental problems. Here 
our senses are used in a thin and functional way. On the other hand per-
sons can live in their senses, by construing their sensory experiences not 
as means to practical ends and problem resolution, but rather as ends in 
themselves. Here our senses are not so much used but lived in a personal 
way. Though people generally use their senses for functional reasons (Mac-
Murray, 2012) the real value of sense experience is rather to be found with-
in personal rather than functional life. This seems to be why MacMurray 
thought education should seek to foster thick and personal emotional ex-
periences rather than thin and functional ones (MacMurray, 1961, 2012). 
The thick living in sense experience entails coming to really know what is 
other than the self, as a thing in itself: as something that exists in its own 
right, as something that is more than object to be used for mere instru-
mental purpose. Thus while MacMurray thought we must live in and learn 
through our own bodies, he was not advocating a self-absorbed dwelling 
in, and focus on, one’s own bodily feelings – such an attitude would be 
functional rather than personal.
Bodily sense experiences only become intrinsically valuable and person-
al when they are contemplative and objective. Contemplative and objective 
sense experiences are both directed at objects or persons other than the self 
and concerned to apprehend more fully the value of what is other than the 
self. He states that ‘contemplation when it is genuine centres our attention 
and interest upon something outside of us, and so is a powerful counterac-
tion to the egocentricity which keeps us juvenile and adolescent. It centres 
our emotional capacities upon the object in a search for its uniqueness and 
reality; and so provides an emotional objectivity for the apprehension of its 
value. So contemplation is a powerful agent for the education of the emo-
tions’ (MacMurray, 2012, p. 672). MacMurray adds that if contemplative 
sense experiences are not cultivated in education then ‘our emotional nature 
remains…crude and childish’ (ibid, p. 672). He maintained that people are 
generally inclined to perceive the world in a self-centred and immature way 
where one’s own interests and desires are deemed to be more important that 
those of others. However, he argued that educated persons have learned to 
focus their sensory attention upon others in an open and accepting spirit - 
and with a desire and capacity to act with and for the other person in a way 
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that helps them grow. MacMurray suggests that living in ones senses in this 
way enables persons to learn with others through love: he states that ‘living 
through the senses is living in love’ (1961, p. 42). 
Education of bodily sense experience thus reveals itself to be vital to Mac-
Murray’s theory of learning to become a person because the senses are the 
means by which persons can learn about the world outside of their own am-
bitions. And it is by living in ones senses and learning about the world be-
yond their individual selves that persons mature, through love. MacMurray 
appears then to have thought that living in the senses and with the whole of 
our bodies made meaningful and loving action possible - and as we learned 
in the second section of this paper, he thought that all meaningful human 
knowledge and action ought to be for the sake of friendship. We thus think 
that in MacMurray’s philosophy, education should cultivate in person’s an 
ability to express the whole of themselves to others through their bodies as 
well as an ability to pay loving attention to what our bodily senses reveal 
to us about others. Given the emphasis his philosophy places on bodily ex-
pression and in learning in and through the body, we think it is surprising 
that physical educationists have not to date shown any interest in MacMur-
ray. We therefore consider the prospects for a MacMurryian philosophy of 
physical education in the final section of this paper - and in particular how 
such a theory might challenge physical educators to reconsider the pur-
poses of their pedagogical practices.
The prospects for a MacMurryian philosophy of 
physical education
We think MacMurray’s philosophy of the personal can shed new light on 
a recurring theme in the history of physical education – namely, the debate 
around the relative educational merit of different types of physical activ-
ity and in particular, the different gains or otherwise associated with team 
games on the one hand and individual activities on the other. In this re-
spect, we think it is important to question again and from different per-
spectives, the value of such activities as views concerning the value of team 
games and individual activities may not have moved on so very much since 
1800. As Kirk (2010, p. 3) notes in recalling histories of physical education 
from the late 1800s onwards, the subjects ‘differences are for the most part 
less significant than the similarities’. In Scotland, it was the visionary and 
reformer, Hely Hutchison Almond, who as Headteacher of Loretto School, 
pioneered in the late 1800s the notion that team games (rugby in particu-
lar) could absorb the enthusiasm and energies of pupils and contribute to 
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the ‘achievement of the kind of proper manliness that parents and teach-
ers desired’ (Holt, 1989, p. 89). However, while team games could cultivate 
shared team spirit and educate pupils how to lose well and win with dignity, 
Almond disliked individual sports (such as athletics) as they compromised 
the collective ethos and sense of fair play that team games could foster 
(Mangan, 2010). Later an ex Loretto pupil under Almond, Robert Mackenzie 
became Headteacher of Edinburgh Academy and he introduced programmes 
of games and physical training that where ‘no more than the application of 
Almond’s ideas to the problems of day-school life’ (Mackenzie, 1906, p. 243). 
Mackenzie’s school arrangements were praised by government inspectors 
and influenced the recommendations of the 1903 Report of the Royal Com-
mission on Physical Training (Scotland) where it is noted that ‘we consider 
that a necessary element in a liberal education of every citizen is a sound 
system of physical training’ (p. 12).
Influenced in many instances by the lack of playing spaces available, the 
version of physical training enacted in the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury was often a Swedish form of gymnastics that emphasized individual 
discipline and precision in the way free standing movements were com-
pleted. The goal was to aid good posture and physical development rather 
than cultivating personal growth (Kirk, 2010). By the middle part of the 
twentieth century Swedish gymnastics was overtaken by the type of activi-
ties Almond would have valued; as Olympic gymnastics and games teach-
ing became an established part of school life. Games were advocated on the 
basis of being a universal good for all pupils, and among the challenges this 
raised was how can games teaching avoid reproducing social and gender 
inequalities. In recent decades related enquiry has often taken the form of 
reviewing the value of sport education programmes in physical education. 
Sport education has a focus on developing pupils’ personal-social needs, 
through supporting inclusion and building social connections (e.g., team 
affiliation, shared communication and decision-making) between pupils as 
well as promoting individuals psychomotor competence and wider affective 
development. Perlman (2011, p. 89) found, for example, that consistently 
playing in the same team plus applying the standardized use of fair play 
guidelines helped ‘create a sense of belonging and enhanced inclusionary 
feelings’. However, the architect of sport education (Daryl Siedentop) in his 
text on this new teaching approach (Siedentop, 1994) largely focused on 
the pragmatics of planning pupils learning experiences rather than elabo-
rating on educational values and how they might underpin and be realized 
through sport education. 
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In most of these developments over the last century, we consider that 
Macmurray’s writings have something of importance to add. While many 
accounts of the educational value of individual and team games have his-
torically tended to variously identify instrumental, functional and/or com-
petitive and individualistic imperatives like a disciplined body, enjoyment 
in winning and losing or team spirit, MacMurray’s philosophy stresses the 
value of more distinctively personal goals. Indeed his view that living in ones 
body can be educationally valuable on account of the close expressive and 
accepting friendships that might become possible through shared physical 
activity does we think open up a different way of thinking about the value 
of physical activity. Macmurray’s writing would, for example, endorse, the 
view that competitive individual activities like tennis cannot be classed as 
genuinely educational unless serious attention is given to supporting pupils 
to play in ways where there is an emphasis on cultivating a fully expres-
sive and personal interaction with the other participants rather than an 
overarching desire to beat opponents. Similarly, reference to Macmurray 
would also highlight that while a game like rugby may afford opportunities 
for teammates to develop fully expressive and accepting friendships with 
their teammates (or perhaps even members of the opposition), if winning 
the game is the goal that unites the teammates then it is probable that the 
interactions in question are, in themselves, social and functional in nature 
rather than educational and personal. Again, Macmurray’s writings would 
support an elaboration of how the contribution of programmes like sport 
education, could if enacted with suitable care and pedagogical sensitivity, 
connect bodily experiences with the development of related friendship goals.
A further possible benefit of Macmurray’s contribution is that it might 
challenge educators to review the aims and teaching approaches adopted on 
physical education programmes. For example, studying Macmurray’s educa-
tional writings at the height of Swedish gymnastics popularity in schools 
would have made it easier to detect that the educational virtues being ad-
vanced in terms of self-discipline and obedience were often being overtaken 
by the needs of institutional order, where ‘transgression meant certain and 
often brutal punishment’ (Kirk, 2010, p. 72). This is something Macmurray 
would have abhorred. Furthermore, in current times, Macmurray’s thought 
highlights the need to review how individual activities can move beyond being 
unduly self-absorbed and narrow in their focus. Encouragingly, writers in the 
field are, from a mostly Merlau-Pontian perspective at present6, beginning to 
6 For recent discussion of the work Merleau-Ponty and/or phenomenology in relation to 
physical education see Thorburn (2008), Martínková I., & Parry J. (2011) and Stolz (2013).
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review how bodily experiences can help persons better understand and make 
meaning from their own lives and those of others. This dual emphasis on the 
bodily experiences of self and others is helpful, as we would argue that there 
is a case to be made for meaningful engagement in routine physical activi-
ties which are pursued together, especially relative to the priority there often 
is nowadays in physical education to emphasize the importance of lifelong 
physical activity. In a MacMurrayian theory of embodied learning though, it 
has hopefully become clear that the primary criterion of any activities’ educa-
tional value is that it promotes personal relations rather than mere individual 
cognitive or emotional development or lifelong physical activity.
A shared cycling venture into a rural and hilly part of the country might be 
an example of such a joint activity. While the solitary cyclist may feel great 
joy in breathing in the country air and accrue cardiovascular and muscular 
benefits from the exercise, the activity only really begins to take on its full 
meaning in a MacMurrayian account if the person can take the bodily joy 
and benefits they feel back into their personal life and in a way that makes 
some of their friendship relations more rich. Thus a given embodied action 
only becomes educationally meaningful for a person when it is carried out 
in the knowledge that its ultimate value is dependent on the extent to which 
it enables them to better foster genuinely open personal relationships with 
others. We happen to think that a physical activity like solo cycling can pro-
vide a physical, cognitive and emotional space that better prepares one to 
relate more fully with others. However, there can be little doubt that a shared 
cycling activity would be preferable in a MacMurryian theory of embodied 
learning especially if all persons’ present experience moments of bodily joy 
and togetherness in the venture and a better understanding of each other.
Some might therefore consider that a MacMurrayian philosophy of physical 
education is somewhat limited in respect to meaning making in and through 
the individual bodily self, as he does generally stress that the types of experi-
ences that can be deemed personally enriching and worthy of educating are 
those that focus on the other rather than the self. However, we consider that 
this is probably not the case, particularly with regard to Macmurray’s writing 
on the benefits of expressive activities such as dance. For MacMurray dance 
is an activity of real educational possibility as it invites persons to act with the 
whole of themselves in an emotionally alive, bodily and personally responsive 
way (MacMurray, 1956). When persons feel and move in their bodies with 
joy and a better understanding of others then that activity begins to become 
educationally meaningful for MacMurray. More broadly then we believe that 
MacMurray’s philosophy can challenge educationists (educationists in gen-
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eral and physical educationists especially) to think again about the impor-
tance of learning together in and through the body and in a non-egocentric 
manner. For MacMurry shared physical pursuits are especially educational 
when carried out for their own sake and when all persons’ present undergo 
moments of bodily joy and togetherness and a better understanding of each 
other. If his philosophy does go too far in denouncing all self-focused bodily 
experiences as meaningless unless they in the end promote a love of other 
persons too, it does perhaps at least encourage persons to think about how 
often they actually do engage in physical activities to learn of and with others 
and for their sake at least as much as their own. In summary, we consider 
that MacMurray’s philosophy of education can, despite its possible limita-
tions, provide an original way of explaining the educational value of bodily 
experiences which can promote friendship and a focus upon the prospering 
of the other rather than (or at least as much as) the self. We think education 
promotes such experiences all too rarely.
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